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bstract
Debt relief provides low-income countries with an incentive to accumulate debt, boost consumption, and reduce investment over time. We
uantify this incentive effect employing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, calibrated to 1982–2006 Ugandan data, and find that
ong-run debt and consumption-to-GDP ratios are about twice as high with debt relief than without it, while the investment-to-GDP ratio is sixty
ercent lower. Our simulations show that debt-relief episodes are likely to have only a temporary impact on debt levels but may have a lasting
ffect over the size of the economy, lowering GDP growth up to twenty percent over time. These results fill a gap in the debt relief literature since,
o the best of our knowledge, the quantification of incentive effects is rather scarce. The paper further contributes to the literature by constructing
 tractable structural model that is able to replicate the data well and captures key features of low-income countries facing the possibility of debt
elief. 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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offers were, however, piecemeal and debt continued to increase
until the mid 1990s. By the early 1990s the international com-
munity started to call for a coordinated effort between bilateraleywords: Debt relief; General equilibrium model; Small open economy
.  Introduction
Following the receipt of debt relief poor countries face a clas-
ic time-consistency problem: they can either constrain their
bsorption and keep the debt-to-GDP ratios at the post-relief
evel or start borrowing again, possibly in excess of pruden-
ial levels. We argue that the recurrent availability of debt-relief
chemes, like the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
nitiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI),
rovide incentives for the latter option.1 The prospect of future
ebt relief motivates indebted countries to contract more debt,
∗ Corresponding author at: 700 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20431,
nited States. Tel.: +1 202 623 7145.
E-mail addresses: almar@iadb.org (A.L. Romero-Barrutieta),
bulir@imf.org (A. Bulírˇ), jrodriguezdelgado@imf.org
J.D. Rodríguez-Delgado).
1 The HIPC initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for poor
ountries with unmanageable debt burdens. The MDRI provides relief to selected
ow-income countries to help them reach the Millennium Development Goals.
or a description of the initiatives see International Monetary Fund (2007),
ttp://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm.
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879-9337/© 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Ancrease consumption, and lower investment. In doing so, these
ountries are driven by the past behavior of donors who have
ranted debt relief to countries whose debts have exceeded
ome arbitrary levels. While donor surveillance of poor-country
conomic programs prevents some of the excessive debt accu-
ulation trajectories, it is unlikely to eliminate the dilemma
ompletely.
After the oil and commodity price shocks of the 1970s
nd 1980s, most low-income countries closed their external
nancing gaps through borrowing and their debt-to-GDP ratios
uickly increased to the point where they could not service
heir loans. Arrears to external lenders became widespread and
ilateral official lenders started to offer increasingly generous
efinancing schemes in the context of the Paris Club.2 These2 The Paris Club is an informal group of nineteen official creditors devoted to
ssist debtor nations to sort out debt payment problems. A detailed chronology
f the relief mechanisms is available in the Paris Club Annual Reports 2007,
008 and 2009.
ll rights reserved.
2 A.L. Romero-Barrutieta et al. / Review of D
Fig. 1. Debt-to-GDP ratio of HIPC at completion point. We aggregate total debt
outstanding at year-end and GDP series in current US$ to compute average debt-
to-GDP ratios of 28 countries at the completion point of the HIPC initiative as
of September 2010.
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relief on consumption, investment, and debt decisions, we con-
trast two scenarios. In the benchmark scenario countries estimate
the likelihood of obtaining debt relief based on the state of theource: World Economic Outlook 2010. Excludes Afghanistan and the Republic
f Congo. e/estimates.
nd multilateral creditors to grant debt relief to those countries
hat were committed to pursuing sustainable macroeconomic
olicies under the IMF-supported adjustment programs. The
nderlying idea was simple. First, countries with a track record
f responsible macroeconomic policies would have their slate
iped clean of debts that were clearly unserviceable. Second,
ooking forward, leaders of the newly debt-free countries would
purn the excessive borrowing of their predecessors and increase
nvestment to encourage growth and reduce poverty.
The 1996 HIPC initiative succeeded in bringing the average
ebt-to-GDP ratio for countries at the completion point to 26
ercent, significantly below the 1996 peak of 128 percent, thus
ulfilling the first objective (Fig. 1). Regarding the second objec-
ive of debt sustainability, will HIPCs remain “debt free” or will
hey be tempted to accumulate debt again? On the one hand,
o limit moral hazard, the HIPC initiative contained a sunset
lause, making the initiative a one-off event and sending a sig-
al that HIPC eligibility would not be unlimited (International
onetary Fund, 2004). On the other hand, the sunset clause was
xtended four times as progress under the initiative was slower
han anticipated and HIPC eligibility was gradually extended. At
he formal conclusion of the initiative the international financial
nstitutions did not foresee any systemic debt difficulties in low-
ncome countries; however, these statements could be hardly
onstrued as a firm pre-commitment of no future debt relief.3
To ascertain the consequences of the lack of pre-commitment
e ask the following question: how different would the behav-
or of low-income countries be with and without debt relief? We
ontribute to the literature by quantifying the incentive effects
f debt relief through the lens of a structural model that includes
ey features of low-income countries. Further, our framework
llows separating the effects of invariant country characteristics
3 See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2010).
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structural parameters) and exogenous shocks from endogenous
hoices including those of consumption and investment. This
ype of analysis is rather scarce in the literature. Specifically,
e ask whether the possibility of debt relief motivates poor
ountries to take on additional debt. In this environment we
xamine the dynamic implications of relief expectations on con-
umption, investment, and the debt-to-GDP ratio given donors’
ebt-relief policy. To this end, we build a parsimonious char-
cterization of debt-relief schemes where donors’ debt-relief
olicy is characterized by a probability rule that encompasses the
riteria traditionally used by donors and international financial
nstitutions: the debt-to-GDP ratio and adverse macroeconomic
onditions, that is, negative productivity shocks. We show that
his simple formulation for debt relief fits the data well. A note of
aution is in order; it is beyond the scope of the paper to propose
n optimal mechanism to allocate debt-relief and we leave the
ormulation of optimal debt-relief rules open for future research.
urthermore, in our approach, we abstract from some important
ssues: first, political economy effects associated with strategic
ehavior by borrowers and lenders; second, learning-by-doing
ffects resulting from past actions; and third, commitment tech-
ologies that could allow the lender to pre-commit to specific
elief mechanisms (e.g., commit not to grant debt relief in the
uture). In particular, this last extension of our framework could
urther enrich the study of the determinants of debt relief from
 time-consistency problem approach.
The small open economy model is calibrated to match the data
or Uganda, the first HIPC-eligible nation to reach the enhanced
IPC initiative completion point in 2000. The model features
 minimum consumption requirement and an endogenous debt-
elief policy rule. The former feature puts a floor under aggregate
onsumption; in particular, a country may decide to acquire addi-
ional debt to secure the subsistence minimum. The latter feature
s meant to capture the relationship between low-income coun-
ry debt decisions and donor relief policy. Moreover, to simplify
he model, we assume that all debt is external, a reasonable sim-
lification as domestic debt markets have been underdeveloped
n HIPC.4
In the model debt decisions depend on the state of the world
nd a stochastic interest rate driven by the probability of debt
elief. Although households do not know whether debt relief
s going to be granted or not, they may formulate expectations
hereof. On the one hand, debt relief is likely to be granted to
 country with either unsustainable debt, or one that clearly has
alance of payment difficulties, or both. On the other hand, poor
ountries do not automatically collect debt relief as donors may
ecide not to grant it.
To quantify the effect of HIPC’s expectations of future debt4 Christensen (2004) found that sub-Saharan domestic debt markets are
enerally small, highly short-term, and have a narrow investor base. During
980–2000 the average domestic debt-to-GDP ratio was 7.6% in HIPC countries
nd only 1.6% of GDP in Uganda, or 1/30 of its external debt.
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ments or international financial institutions, such as the World
Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), or Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB).5A.L. Romero-Barrutieta et al. / Revie
orld (realization of productivity shocks) and their current debt-
o-GDP ratio. In the second scenario no debt relief is offered
rrespective of the state of the world. We find that debt relief
otivates low-income countries to borrow more, consume more,
nd invest less over time. Long-run debt and consumption-to-
DP ratios are about twice as high with debt relief than without
t, while the investment-to-GDP ratio is 60 percent lower. Our
uantitative results cast doubt on the idea that a debt write-off
ould promote rapid capital accumulation and growth, while
imultaneously keeping debt at a sustainable level since debt-
elief episodes are likely to have only a temporary impact on
ebt levels but a lasting effect lowering the size of the economy.
n our set-up poor countries face incentives to borrow unsustain-
bly to finance consumption and wait for another relief episode
ather than to finance future consumption through savings and
nvestment alone.
We also estimate the potential welfare gains from eliminating
he consumption volatility generated by debt relief. We perform
wo policy experiments, tweaking the original relief mechanism
o respond only to either productivity shocks or to large debt.
e find that a simplified debt-relief rule that compensates low-
ncome countries for negative productivity shocks, while ignor-
ng the debt-to-GDP ratio, would provide much better incentives
or capital accumulation at the same cost to the donors. The pol-
cy implication is that the debt-relief mechanism needs to limit
he incentive effect from donors’ history of past write-offs that
end to reinforce expectations of future debt-relief initiatives.
Our findings build on several past contributions. Easterly
2002) argued that past debt relief mostly benefited HIPC with
ad domestic policies rather than those with good policies.
egressing the 1980–1997 average of selected policy and macro-
conomic indicators on the log of initial income, and using a
ummy variable for the HIPC status, Easterly showed that these
ndicators were the worst in the HIPC group. He concluded that
ad policies have not only resulted in high debt accumulation,
hey have also neutralized past debt-relief efforts. Such behav-
or appears consistent with HIPC policy makers expecting even
etter debt-relief terms before finally committing to sustainable
olicies. We show that excessive borrowing is not necessarily
 sign of a bad government: it may also arise with benevolent
overnments.
Chauvin and Kraay (2007) showed that developing countries
ith large debts vis-á-vis multilateral creditors are more likely
o receive debt relief and that such relief does not respond to fluc-
uations in GDP growth. Employing data on the cross-country
llocation of debt relief for 62 low-income countries, the authors
nd that debt relief is mainly driven by country characteristics
nd suggest that, unless debt relief changes those characteristics,
ebtors and creditors may face repeated cycles of debt relief.
ur paper formalizes the notion that a low-income country may
xperience repeated debt-relief episodes that have only a tem-
orary impact on the level of debt due to the incentive effect that
ebt-relief availability creates.Arslanalp and Henry (2005) compared the conditions in
iddle-income, mostly Latin American countries that benefited
rom debt restructuring using the so-called Brady bonds in
he 1990s and HIPC facilities. They conclude that the HIPC bevelopment Finance 5 (2015) 1–12 3
nitiative would fail to stimulate HIPC economic growth since
heir main problem is not debt overhang but a lack of strong
nstitutions. We show that even with good institutions the
urrent debt initiatives could lead countries back to a pattern of
arge debt, low investment, and increased consumption.
Koeda (2006) explored the low-income countries’ incentive
roblem as the optimal response to lending rules, under which
oncessional loans are granted to countries with income below a
ut-off value and commercial loans to others. The dual lending
tandard and low growth ensure future aid flows (soft loans).
e extend Koeda’s framework through modeling debt forgive-
ess as write-offs of existing debt, whereby donor concessional
ending determines the value the interest rate can take on.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After
eviewing the evolution of debt in Uganda, we outline the model
nd describe its calibration. In the next sections we present the
imulations for the scenarios with and without debt relief as well
s for alternative formulations of the debt relief mechanism. The
nal section concludes.
.  The  debt  problem  and  the  HIPC  initiatives
The HIPC group is composed of forty countries, most of
hem in sub-Saharan Africa. A poor country is considered to
e heavily indebted if its annual gross national income (GNI)
er capita is below the International Development Association’s
IDA) eligibility threshold for concessional loans (US$1095 in
009) and if after traditional debt-relief mechanisms, such as
oan rescheduling at a new market rate and improved repayment
rofiles have been applied, either the debt-to-exports ratio is still
bove 150 percent or the debt-to-fiscal-revenue ratio is larger
han 250 percent for very open economies.
The origin of the sub-Saharan African countries’ debt prob-
em has been attributed to the short-lived increase in primary
ommodity prices after the 1973 oil price shock (Green, 1989).
he national authorities responded to the positive terms of
rade shock by expanding their infrastructure spending, which
as partly financed by foreign borrowing. When export prices
eclined government expenditures were sustained by additional
orrowing under the assumption that these prices would recover
uickly. They did not and the debt service burden continued to
ncrease. The second oil price shock in 1979 stoked inflation
n developed economies and the resulting monetary tighten-
ng led to sharply increasing real interest rates. As the most
ndebted countries began to default in Latin America, risk pre-
iums increased across the world, and the cost of commercial
orrowing became prohibitive. Among the HIPC nations interest
ayments doubled during 1980–1987. Following the debt crisis
f the early 1980s, virtually all new borrowing by HIPC was from
he so-called official creditors, either industrial-country govern-5 For instance, according to the World Development Indicators database,
etween 1970 and 1987 World Bank lending to sub-Saharan Africa grew by
4 w of Development Finance 5 (2015) 1–12
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Fig. 2. Uganda: Debt Stocks and Disbursements, 1971–2011. (1) Total debt in
current US$; the GDP series is smoothed with the Hodrick–Prescott filter to limit
volatility in Ugandan US dollar GDP. (2) Total external debt disbursements in
millions of constant 2005 US$; available only until 2008.
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As of 1987, 80 percent of sub-Saharan external debt was owed
o official creditors and international institutions, who began
o realize that these debts were not sustainable. The creditors
esponded with increasingly concessional facilities: the Paris
lub gradually raised the write-off amount in its rescheduling
rom 33 percent in 1989 to 67 percent in 1994, and the IMF
ffered a lending facility repayable in ten years, with a grace
eriod of five years, and an interest rate of 1/2 percent. Overall
ebt continued to increase, however, as the bulk of HIPC debt
as due to multilateral lenders who could neither reschedule nor
ancel them at that time. In 1996 the IMF and the World Bank
aunched the HIPC initiative, enhancing it in 1999, granting
rite-offs of multilateral debt for the first time.
Eligibility for the HIPC initiative required adoption and
uccessful implementation of an IMF-supported adjustment
rogram and a poverty-reducing strategy. At the onset of the
rogram the country’s eligible debt was either written off up
o 67 percent in net present value terms or rescheduled over
3–40 years with a long grace period. After successfully imple-
enting the pro-growth and poverty-reducing policies, HIPC
ere eligible for cancellation of 90 percent of non-official debt
nd rescheduling of the remainder. On completion of the whole
rocess the Paris Club reduced the stock of eligible debt, often
eyond the 90 percent cut-off point, and the IMF, World Bank,
fDB, and IDB cancelled all debt owed to them, in accordance
ith the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. As of early 2014, 37
ountries benefited from the MDRI.
.  The  Ugandan  experience  with  debt  relief
Uganda exemplifies the travails of debt relief: during
982–2006 the country received some sort of debt relief on seven
ccasions, that is, on average every 3.5 years. In 1998, Uganda
ecame the first country to receive debt relief under the HIPC
nitiative, just one year after having its reforms endorsed by
he IMF and World Bank. The 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 debt
rite-offs under the MDRI were equivalent to a further US$3.6
illion. As a result, Uganda’s total debt outstanding declined
rom its 1992 peak of 102 percent of GDP to about 12 percent
f GDP in 2007. The debt ratio varies on the account of GDP
easurement issues and exchange rate volatility, however, after
moothing the U.S. dollar GDP by the Hodrick-Prescott filter
e still observe a decline from a peak of about 75 percent of
moothed GDP to 12 percent of GDP or from debt per capita of
bout US$ 200 (in constant 2005 dollars) to less than US$ 50
Fig. 2, upper panel). It is interesting to note that by end-2013
he external debt-to-GDP ratio was more than 20 percent of GDP
nd overall public debt was about 35 percent of GDP (or triple
f its post-MDRI level), and was projected to increase to about
3 percent of GDP by 2018/19 (IMF, 2014).
How did Uganda become “highly indebted” in the first place?
hile in the early 1970s the external debt was below 10 percent
0 percent annually (in US$ terms). This behavior has been highlighted by
 strand of the literature as lenders’ complicity in low-income countries debt
ccrual (Easterly, 2002).
4
e
m
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f
pource: World Economic Outlook and Global Development Finance. Data for
010–2011 are WEO projections.
f GDP, it increased ten times in less than 20 years. The answer
s consistent with the general HIPC story—in the late 1970s and
arly 1980s Uganda began to borrow more, above and beyond
ts debt service capacity. The annual average of external gross
orrowing—measured by disbursements in 2005 constant US
ollars—quadrupled from US$ 100 million in the 1970s to about
S$ 400 million in the period until 2001 (Fig. 2, bottom panel).
eedless to say, the volatility of commodity prices amplified the
S$ GDP decline in the early 1990s and contributed to the spike
n the debt-to-GDP ratio.
.  The  model  economy
In this section we present a dynamic stochastic general
quilibrium model of a small open economy with a mini-
um consumption requirement and an endogenous debt-reliefrobability that builds on Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) port-
olio adjustment costs model. The minimum consumption level
revents the country from borrowing excessively, while the
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vailability of debt-relief provides it with the incentive to borrow
ore and invest less than otherwise.
The economy is modeled in a world with perfect informa-
ion (agents’ decisions are all observable), perfect competition
agents take the market structure as given), and perfectly
nforceable contracts (the relief mechanism is available every
eriod and the low-income country honors its debts when relief
s not granted). We abstract from asymmetric information, strate-
ic behavior, and enforcement issues in order to disentangle the
ffect of debt-relief availability from other possible explanations
or the HIPC debt-accumulation problem and show that even in
 frictionless environment this problem may arise.
Moreover, to further simplify the analysis, donors’ lending
olicy is reduced to the supply of concessional loans, avail-
ble every period and treated as one-year, risk-free bonds that
erfectly meet the country’s borrowing needs.
.1.  Environment
The economy consists of a representative profit maximiz-
ng firm and an infinitely lived utility-maximizing stand-in
onsumer.6 The firm rents capital, Kt, and labor, Lt, from the
ousehold and pays a competitive interest rate, rt, and wage,
t. The consumer has access to two saving mechanisms: capital
ccumulation and a one-year, risk-free bond. Debt payments are
tochastically determined each year through a debt-relief lottery:
hey are either written-off or have to be repaid in full.
.2.  Technology
The productive sector of the economy is represented by a firm
ith a constant returns to scale technology:
t =  ZtKαt L1−αt (1)
ith stochastically determined productivity, Zt = ¯Zezt , where
¯
 is the economy’s average productivity level and zt is a ran-
om productivity shock, which follows an AR(1) process, zt =
zt−1 +  εt,  εt∼N(0,  σ2ε ) and ρ  <  1. The capital share of income
s denoted by α  ∈  (0,  1).
The firm solves the standard profit maximization problem by
hoosing sequences of labor {Lt}∞t=0 and capital {Kt}∞t=0 so as
o
ax{Kt,Lt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
(ZtKαt L1−αt −  wtLt −  rtKt); Kt,  Lt ≥  0.
(2)
.3.  PreferencesThe representative consumer has time-separable preferences
epresented by a period CRRA utility function with a survival
6 We use the terms “consumer” and “household” interchangeably throughout
his section.
s
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evel of consumption, cmin ≥  0, time preferences, β  ∈  (0,  1),
nd a risk aversion coefficient, σ  >  0. The consumer’s expected
tility is represented by:
0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(ct −  cmin)1−σ
1 −  σ
]
.  (3)
he above utility formulation has been previously employed to
odel differences in saving rates across households (Chatterjee,
994; Chatterjee and Ravikumar, 1999; Alvarez-Pelaez and
iaz, 2005; Obiols-Homs and Urrutia, 2005), to capture differ-
nt intertemporal elasticities of substitution among poor and rich
ountries (Atkenson and Ogaki, 1996, 1997), or to study the dis-
ributional implications of economic growth (Ogaki et al., 1996).
e introduce the survival level of consumption to capture the
eature of low saving rates in poor countries. The populations of
uch countries are often left—after satisfying the subsistence
equirements—with little or no resources for saving and are
herefore prone to overborrowing to finance investment. In a
tochastic environment a consumption minimum works in two
irections. On the one hand, it motivates the household to bor-
ow in order to attain the survival consumption level, i.e., the
tandard intertemporal smoothing role of finance (Rosenzweig
nd Wolpin, 1993). On the other hand, it constrains its borrowing
s the household is aware that the joint occurrence of a negative
roductivity shock and a no-relief outcome of the lottery could
ush its consumption below the survival level.
At time t, the household divides its labor income, wtlt , cap-
tal income, rtkt, and bond-holding proceeds, (1 +  it)dt , among
onsumption, ct, investment, xt, and the next period portfolio
llocation, dt+1. In order to characterize the low-income country
ebt-accumulation problem, dt+1 <  0 denotes a one-period loan
aken by the consumer in period t  and carried over to period t + 1
t the interest rate it+1.
The household accumulates capital by adding investment to
he current capital stock, free of depreciation, δ  ∈  (0,  1), after
overing capital adjustment costs to transform today’s capital
nto tomorrow’s capital.
t+1 =  (1 −  δ)kt + xt −  Ψ (kt,  kt+1).  (4)
apital adjustment costs are used to ensure that the volatility
f investment in the model corresponds to that observed in the
ata and are represented by a convex function Ψ (kt,  kt+1) as in
endoza (1991),
(kt,  kt+1) = ψ2 (kt+1 −  kt)
2 (5)
here ψ >  0 is a constant determining the size of the adjustment
ost.
We further assume that the household faces portfolio adjust-
ent costs of holding debt in quantities different from the steady
tate level of debt ¯d. Such costs capture transaction costs and
lso ensure stationarity in small open economy models with
ncomplete markets (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003). In our
odel, the presence of these costs ensures gradual borrowing
djustments in response to productivity and debt-relief shocks,
enerating smooth equilibrium debt dynamics.
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The debt adjustment cost function Ξ(dt+1) is assumed to be
onvex as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), where κ  >  0 is a
onstant determining the size of the bond holding cost:
(dt+1) = κ2 (dt+1 −
¯d)2. (6)
he sequential budget constraint is then:
t +  xt +  dt+1 =  wtlt +  rtkt +  (1 +  it)dt −  Ξ(dt+1).  (7)
.4.  The  debt-relief  mechanism
Debt relief is modeled as a lottery with two possible out-
omes. At time t, the household observes the exogenously
etermined interest rate it, that can take on two possible val-
es, either −1, indicating full debt relief, or a concessional
nternational rate, i∗ ≥  0.  Hence, with probability φt ∈  [0,  1]
he household has all its debt forgiven and does not have to
ake any repayment, (1 +  it) =  0. With probability (1 −  φt)
he household has to repay all debt in full, (1 +  it) =  (1 +  i∗).
o this end, debt payments are stochastically determined by the
ollowing rule:
t =
{−1 with probability φt
i∗ with probability 1 −  φt
.
onors’ debt-relief policy is represented by a probability rule,
(zt,  dt/Yt), that depends on the exogenous productivity shock,
t, and the country’s existing debt-to-GDP ratio, dt/Yt:(
zt,
dt
Yt
)
= 1
1 +  e−(φ1ezt+φ2(dt/Yt )) (8)
here φ1,  φ2 ≤  0 are constants determining the impact of pro-
uctivity shocks and the country’s indebtedness ratio in the
elief-probability function. To characterize HIPC-like initia-
ives with eligibility criteria favoring poor and highly indebted
ations, the debt-relief rule is an increasing function of nega-
ive productivity shocks, Φz <  0, and of the debt-to-GDP ratio,
d/Y <  0.
Each period, the household forms rational expectations on the
V  (k,  d,  z,  i) =  Max{c,k′,d′}
⎧⎨
⎩ (c −  cmin)
1−σ
1 −  σ +  β
∑
z′
π(z′|z){φ(k
subject to
c +  k′ +  d′ ≤ ¯Zezkα +  (1 −  δ)k  − ψ
2
(k′ −  k)2 +  (1 +  i)d  − κ
2
φ(k′,  d′,  z′) =  Φ
(
z′,
d′
¯Zez
′
k′α
)
d′ ≥  −M
c  ≥  cmin.utcome of the lottery. On the one hand, the larger the current
ebt-to-GDP ratio, the larger the probability of obtaining debt
elief. On the other hand, the household may fail to attain the
inimum consumption level and perish if after being hit by
5
cevelopment Finance 5 (2015) 1–12
 negative productivity shock it were required to pay back its
ebts. Fig. 3 illustrates the debt-relief mechanism.
.5.  The  household  problem
At time t, the household takes expectations over the shock, zt,
nd interest rates, it, and chooses sequences of consumption, ct,
nvestment, xt and next period debt holdings, dt+1, to maximize
ts lifetime utility. The labor endowment is normalized to 1 and
s inelastically supplied.
For given prices, optimal decision rules for ct, xt, and dt+1,
olve the household problem:
ax{ct ,xt ,dt+1}∞t=0E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(ct −  cmin)1−σ
1 −  σ
]
(9)
ubject to
ct +  dt+1 +  xt ≤  wt +  rtkt +  (1 +  it)dt − κ2 (dt+1 −
¯d)2
kt+1 =  (1 −  δ)kt +  xt − ψ2 (kt+1 −  kt)
2
ct ≥  cmin
dt+1 ≥  −M
k0,  d0 given
here the lower bound dt+1 ≥  −M  prevents the consumer from
unning a Ponzi scheme.
.6.  Rational  expectations  equilibrium  and  its  recursive
epresentation
Given the international interest rate, i*, a competitive  equi-
ibrium  is a sequence of prices {wt,  rt}∞t=0, and allocations
ct,  kt+1,  dt+1, Kt,  Lt}∞t=0 such that: (i) {ct, kt+1,  dt+1}∞t=0
olves the household’s problem (9), (ii) {Kt,  Lt}∞t=0 solves the
rm’s problem (2), and for all t, (iii) Kt = kt, and (iv) Lt = 1.
More conveniently, the sequential household and firm prob-
ems can be summarized in a recursive problem solved by a
enevolent social planner:
 z′)V  (k′, d′, z′, −1) +  (1 −  φ(k′,  d′,  z′))V  (k′,  d′, z′, i∗)}
⎫⎬
⎭
¯d)2 (10).  Simulation  results
The model is solved by value function iteration over a dis-
retized state space and we perform two simulations. In the first
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ne we explore household choices when debt relief is available,
hile in the second one there is no lottery and no debt relief.
alibration parameters are obtained from previous research or
elected from data such that the model with debt relief replicates
mpirical regularities of the Ugandan economy.
.1.  Calibration
In this section, we describe the selection criteria for param-
ter values taken from the existing literature and estimation
rocedures for parameters exclusive to the model (Table 1).
he economy’s total factor productivity is computed as a resid-
al after accounting for productive factors, Zt =  Yt/Kαt L1−αt .
e calculate Zt using data from the WEO database on out-
ut and investment, measured as gross fixed capital formation
nd changes in inventories, and World Development Indicators
WDI) data on labor employment, measured as working-age
opulation.
The capital share of income is set to α  =  0.3, a standard value
n the business cycle literature. The average productivity level
s normalized to ¯Z =  1. The exogenous productivity shock, zt,
s assumed to follow an AR(1) process and it is estimated using
he Solow residual. The realizations for zt and the corresponding
ransition matrix are estimated using the Touchen’s method with
 grid of 9 equidistant points. Following Kehoe and Ruhl (2003)
e generate a capital stock series using investment data for
able 1
arameter values used in simulations.
arameter Symbol Relief
epreciation rate (in percent) δ 4.89
apital’s share of income α 0.3
verage productivity level ¯Z 1
ime preference β 0.95
isk aversion coefficient σ 0.964
apital adjustment cost constant ψ 2.9
ebt adjustment cost constant  6.5
eal interest rate (in percent) i* 5.88
roductivity shock constant in debt relief function φ1 −28.64
ebt/GDP constant in debt relief function φ2 −36.77
elief probability constant a1 0.999
elief probability adjustment factor a2 −24.1
he last four parameters are used to transform a standard logistic function into
q. (8).
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970–2006 and the capital accumulation process (4). The depre-
iation rate and the initial capital stock are determined jointly:
or a given value for δ, the initial capital stock is selected such that
he capital-output ratio in 1970 is the same as its average value
uring 1970–2006. Specifically, setting δ =  0.0489 ensures that
he 2006 capital consumption-to-output ratio, δ(Kt/Yt), is 0.072,
s observed in the Ugandan data.
The preference parameters, the discount factor, β,  and the
isk aversion coefficient, σ,  are set in line with the estimations
f the consumption minimum as in Chatterjee and Ravikumar
1999), where such minimum is estimated to be about 58 percent
f average consumption. This estimate is consistent with a risk
version parameter of 0.964 and a discount factor of 0.95.
The real interest rate, i∗ =  5.88 percent, matches the
983–2006 average of the Commercial Interest Reference Rate
CIRR) published by the OECD, a standard reference for conces-
ional rates.7 The country does not pay the much higher market
ate as the debt-relief lottery determines whether the loan carries
he concessional rate or is written off.8 Donor lending is con-
essional both in the sense that the actual interest rate is lower
han commercial rates and that it allows for debt write-off.
Regarding the intrinsic model parameters in the debt proba-
ility rule (φ1, φ2), we choose their values so as to fit the data. We
un a restricted logit regression using the years at which Uganda
eceived debt relief from the Paris Club during the 1982–2006
eriod and using debt ratios and productivity as the explanatory
ariables in the spirit of Chauvin and Kraay (2007). Restrictions
mposed on the regression guarantee that: (i) zero probability of
rite-off is assigned to the null debt ratio, Φ(zt,  0) =  0,  ∀zt ;
nd (ii) the steady state debt ratio matches the 1982–2006 aver-
ge for Uganda. Finally, a logistic function is transformed to
nsure that for each dt/Yt ∈  (−∞,  0] there were corresponding
ebt relief probability values, φt ∈  [0,  1).
The capital adjustment cost parameter ψ  in Eq. (5) is cho-
en to match the relative volatility of investment and GDP. The
ortfolio adjustment cost parameter κ in Eq. (6) is calibrated to
atch the service fee charged by multilateral development banks
n total debt outstanding and disbursed balances of concessional
oans.9
.2.  The  debt-relief  scenarioIn period t, the planner observes both the productivity shock,
t, and the period interest rate, it, and then decides consumption,
7 The CIRRs are minimum interest rates applied to official financing support
or export credits and are used as reference for calculating the concessionality
evel of aid. We employ CIRRs with a maturity of 8.5 years as a representative
ate for concessional loans received by Uganda. For the CIRR calculations
ee Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009),
ttp://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,3425,en 2649 34171 2428234 1 1 1 1,
0.htmlon.
8 Uribe and Yue (2006) estimated that in 1994–2001 emerging countries faced
arket rates composed of the average U.S. interest rate of 4 percent and an
verage country premium of 7 percent. In practice, most HIPC’s IMF-supported
rograms contained a condition of no commercial borrowing (at market rates).
9 See World Bank (2001), section on IDA eligibility, terms and graduation
olicies (Table 3, annex II, p. 24).
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increases to 24.1 percent of GDP, as compared to 15.4 percent
of GDP. As a result, GDP is on average 22 percent larger than
with debt relief. These outcomes imply that, with debt relief
Table 2
Key data to be matched in the simulation with debt relief.
Data Model
Average debt-relief probability (in percent)a 28 29.56
Average debt/GDP ratio (in percent)a 51.58 52.32
Relative standard deviation of investment and GDPa 2.74 2.02
Ratio of minimum to average consumption (in percent)b 58 57.55
Portfolio adjustment cost of average debt (in percent)c 0.75 0.76
All variables are in natural logarithms and filtered by a linear trend.
aFig. 4. Debt ratio a
apital, and debt to solve the optimization problem described in
q. (10).
The debt-to-GDP ratio increases/decreases when the model
conomy is hit by a negative/positive productivity shock and
he correlation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and TFP shocks
s strong at 0.95 (see the full and dashed lines in Fig. 4). The
imulation also confirms a strong correlation between adverse
roductivity shocks and relief episodes. In the model economy
ebt relief is almost always granted when the country is hit by
ny of the three most negative productivity shocks and in about
/2 half of all instances when hit with the smallest negative shock
Fig. 5). In contrast, relief is not granted when the model econ-
my is hit with positive shocks. As the shocks are observable by
enders, this result can be interpreted as donors requesting a full
epayment when “times are good.”
The simulated economy replicates the Ugandan stylized facts
ell. Uganda received debt relief on seven occasions during
982–2006, that is, every 3.5 years the country benefited from
ither a rescheduling, extension, or write-off of debt owed to the
aris Club members, implying a debt-relief probability of about
8 percent. On average, the model yields a debt-relief probability
f 29.6 percent and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 52.3 percent, close to
he 51.6 percent in the data (Table 2). The model also matches
ther relevant variables: the ratio of the standard deviation of
nvestment to that of GDP in the data and in the model are 2.74
nd 2.02, respectively; the data and model portfolio adjustment
ost of average debt holdings are 0.75 and 0.76 percent, respec-
ively; and the minimum-to-average consumption ratio of 57.6
ercent in the model is close to the 58 percent ratio reported in
he literature.bt-relief episodes.
.3.  The  scenario  without  debt  relief
In the counterfactual simulation debt relief is not available.
he planner observes the realization of the shock, and then
ecides consumption, capital, and debt to solve problem Eq.
10) without considering debt relief. Parameter values used in
he simulation are identical to those previously used in the debt-
elief case (Table 1), the only difference being that we set the
elief probability value, φt , equal to zero.
We compare debt, investment, and consumption as shares of
DP between the two scenarios (Table 3 and Fig. 6). In the
bsence of debt relief, the average debt-to-GDP ratio declines
o 24.3 percent, less than one-half of the ratio in the former sce-
ario, the consumption-to-GDP ratio is halved, while investmentParis Club and World Economic Outlook; authors’ calculations.
b Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1999).
c Service fee charged by multilateral development banks.
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Fig. 5. Productivity shocks and conditional debt-relief probability.
Table 3
Summary of simulation results.
Relief No relief
Debt/GDP (in percent) 52.32 24.29
Investment/GDP (in percent) 15.41 24.14
Consumption/GDP (in percent) 100 47.44
Investment/Disposable income (in percent) 13 33
Consumption/Disposable income (in percent) 87 67
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5isposable income is defined as GDP plus net debt inflows as in Eq. (11).
xpectations, investing in physical capital is less attractive for
he country since a larger GDP reduces the chance to obtain
ebt relief. Consumption smoothing is provided, at least partly
hrough debt relief. In contrast, when debt relief is absent, a
arger capital stock serves to smooth consumption.10
To further illustrate the distortion in resource allocation that
tochastic debt relief introduces we also compare (net) invest-
ent and consumption as shares of disposable income (DI)
efined as GDP plus net debt inflows, (1 +  it)dt −  dt+!, free
f capital and debt adjustment costs:
It =  Yt −  Ψ (kt,  kt+1) +  (1 +  it)dt −  dt+1 −  Ξ(dt+1) (11)We find that the average investment-to-DI ratios are 13
ercent and 33 percent with and without debt relief, respec-
ively. The average consumption-to-DI ratios are 87 percent
nd 67 percent, respectively. When debt relief is available, the
10 This finding is in line with the literature on household accumulation of
ealth. Hubbard et al. (1995) showed that asset-based means testing welfare
rograms can have distortionary effects on savings behavior by discourag-
ng households with low expected lifetime income to accumulate their own
recautionary wealth.
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uFig. 6. Macroeconomic outcomes under alternative relief scenarios.
ountry consumes a larger fraction of its disposable income and
onsequently invests a lesser proportion of it.
.4.  Welfare  implications
Although higher in mean and levels, the consumption stream
ith debt relief is significantly more volatile. We evaluate the
mpact of economic instability generated by the debt-relief lot-
ery on consumer welfare using the Lucas’ (1987) definition
f compensating variation. The cost of consumption instability
s equivalent to the percentage increase in consumption, uni-
orm across all dates and values of the shocks, needed to leave
he consumer indifferent between a perfectly smooth consump-
ion stream and a consumption path with variability about its
rend. Such cost is estimated as 1/2 times the risk aversion
oefficient times the consumption variability. To this end, we
se the standard deviation of the linearly detrended log of the
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ptimal consumption sequence obtained in the relief and no-
elief scenarios.11
Eliminating aggregate consumption variability in the debt-
elief scenario is equivalent to a sizable increase of 0.85 percent
n average consumption, while the same computation in the no-
elief scenario yields a negligible increase of 0.01 percent. Such
normous difference is fully attributable to debt-relief shocks
s the contribution of productivity shocks is nugatory. While
ebt-relief events magnify consumption variability and increase
elfare losses, the elimination of the uncertainty of debt-relief
utcomes implies a potential welfare gain.12
.  Policy  experiments
In this section we present the macroeconomic implications
f two alternative debt-relief mechanisms. Recall that in the
enchmark model debt relief is driven by two events. First,
he economy is hit by an exogenous negative shock and debt
elief offsets the shock’s impact. Second, the debt-to-GDP ratio
ncreases either because the country borrowed too much or GDP
eclined owing to capital decumulation, TFP shocks, or both. We
ow consider the outcomes of debt-relief mechanisms activated
ither by changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio only or by produc-
ivity shocks only. It turns out that a relief policy responding
o a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio generates most of the macro-
conomic differences between the debt-relief and the no-relief
cenarios observed in Fig. 6, while a simplified debt-relief rule
hat compensates for output losses from negative productivity
hocks only is sufficient to motivate the household to invest
ptimally, i.e., as in the no-relief scenario.
.1.  The  debt-relief  mechanism  responding  to  the
ebt-to-GDP ratio  only
By linking debt relief to the debt-to-GDP ratio only, creditors
gnore the first-round effects of “bad luck.” While the economy
s still hit by productivity shocks, the debt relief lottery acknowl-
dges only the eventual adverse effect of the higher debt-to-GDP
atio. Parameter values remain as in Table 1, with the exception
f the constant multiplying the productivity shock parameter in
he debt-relief probability function, φ1, which is set to zero.
We find that the debt-to-GDP ratio drives debt-relief expec-
ations and that productivity shocks explain only a minor part
f these expectations. The average debt-to-GDP ratio in the
odified relief mechanism is only slightly lower than in the
11 A similar analysis was performed by Arellano et al. (2009) when assessing
otential welfare costs associated with the increased consumption volatility that
id flows might induce. The welfare benefit of reducing aid volatility to zero was
stimated to be about 0.4 percent of consumption, a rather large estimate when
ompared to the standard cost of business cycles for industrialized economies
one tenth of a percentage point for the United States for the post-war period
ccording to Lucas’ calculations).
12 This result is analogous to Pallage et al. (2006) finding that a welfare cost in
he order of three-fourths of aggregate consumption volatility is associated with
rocyclical aid flows to developing countries. This cost could be potentially
liminated if aid were used as an insurance mechanism to smooth aggregate
onsumption.
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enchmark case: 49 percent and 52 percent, respectively (com-
are the first and second set of columns in Fig. 6). In terms of
esource allocation we find similar outcomes to those obtained
nder the benchmark mechanism: on average 17 percent of dis-
osable income is invested and 83 percent is consumed. These
esults fit the behavior of a planner controlling the “borrowing”
art of the debt-relief lottery and a donor who is under domes-
ic political pressure to cancel “odious” debt, indicating that 87
ercent of additional debt in the relief scenario is due to the
ountry’s own borrowing decisions and only 13 percent is due
o exogenous shocks.
.2.  The  debt-relief  mechanism  responding  to  productivity
hocks only
In this section we solve the model under the assumption that
reditors only consider the realization of the productivity shock
hen granting debt relief, i.e., debt relief serves as an insurance
echanism. Making debt relief respond only to truly exoge-
ous productivity shocks (bad luck), the equilibrium dynamics
f debt, consumption, and investment appear broadly identical
o the no-relief scenario (Fig. 6).
To illustrate the effect of this modified debt-relief mechanism
n investment, we perform the following comparison: control-
ing for both the initial conditions—(k, d, z)—and for the amount
f debt relief granted—(1 + i*)d—the planner chooses an invest-
ent level that is on average 90 percent higher than that chosen
nder the benchmark model. This additional capital is on aver-
ge equivalent to 140 percent of the amount of relief granted,
aking debt relief more effective in encouraging investment.
.  Conclusions
We show that the recurrent availability of debt relief creates a
uantitatively important incentive problem. Donors’ debt-relief
olicy has reinforced HIPC expectations of future debt relief as
pposed to relying on domestic saving. Therefore, when debt
elief is available high debt does not necessarily signal a “bad”
overnment since it also arises with benevolent governments. We
xamine the effect of HIPC-like expectations of future debt relief
n consumption, investment, and debt decisions by comparing
imulation results from two scenarios in a dynamic stochastic
eneral equilibrium model of a small open economy, calibrated
sing Ugandan data for the 1982–2006 period. In the debt-relief
cenario the country estimates the likelihood of obtaining write-
ffs based on the realization of exogenous productivity shocks
nd its current debt-to-GDP ratio. In the counterfactual, no-relief
cenario, consumption, investment, and debt decisions are made
ndependently of the debt-relief lottery.
We find that the debt-to-GDP ratio is higher and the
nvestment-to-GDP ratio is lower when debt relief is available.
s a result, GDP is on average lower by more than 20 per-
ent when the country expects a debt write-off as compared to
 situation when it does not. These results are at odds with the
ommonly held perception that debt-relief initiatives encourage
apital accumulation and a decline of debt. Welfare analysis sug-
ests that the uncertainty associated with debt relief amplifies
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he volatility of consumption and that there is a potential welfare
ain of 0.84 percent of average consumption if such volatility
s eliminated. Policy experiments with variations to the original
ebt relief mechanism suggest that most of the debt and invest-
ent distortions can be eliminated by providing debt relief only
o countries hit by negative productivity shocks. Such modifi-
ation of the debt relief mechanism is both welfare enhancing
nd—from the point of view of the donor community—more
ost effective in spurring investment.
Finally, we argue that high debt-to-GDP ratios may reemerge
n the medium-to-long term. Unless donors credibly pre-commit
ever to grant debt relief in the future, the currently designed
ebt-relief mechanisms would distort low-income countries’
ecisions by encouraging them to carry larger debt, consume
ore, and invest less than what they would have chosen in
he absence of debt relief. Our simulations suggest that it has
een primarily the endogenous borrowing choice—domestic
olicies—that have driven the accumulation of large debts in the
ast four decades, while the contribution of adverse productivity
hocks—“bad luck”—was negligible.
cknowledgements
Alma Romero-Barrutieta is indebted to V.V. Chari, Tim
ehoe, and Terry Roe for their insightful comments and sug-
estions, and to John S. Chipman for his everlasting support.
e also thank Alex Mourmouras, Andy Berg, Enrica Detra-
iache, Leonardo Martínez, Maral Shamloo, Evan Tanner, Tao
u, and Paolo Drummond for suggestions. The paper bene-
ted from comments at seminars at the IMF and University of
innesota.
ppendix.
escription  of  data
Period covered: 1979–2006
Country covered: Uganda
ata  sources
Total debt outstanding, exchange rate, gross domestic prod-
ct, gross fixed capital formation, and trade balance data are from
he International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
atabase. Total and working age population data are from the
orld Development Indicators database of the World Bank. The
ollowing table summarizes the description of the data used in
imulations and corresponding sources.
Data description and sources
escription Database Series code
otal debt outstanding at
ear-end, current U.S. Dollars
WEO W746Dxchange rate, national
urrency per U.S. Dollar
WEO W746ENDA
ross fixed capital formation,
urrent prices, local currency
WEO W746NFI
K
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Data description and sources
escription Database Series code
ross domestic product,
urrent prices, local currency
WEO W746LP
ross domestic product,
onstant prices, local
urrency
WEO W746NGDP
ross domestic product,
urrent prices, U.S. dollars
WEO W746NGDP R
opulation, total WDI SP.POP.TOTL
opulation, ages 15–64 (% of
otal)
WDI SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS
rade balance for goods WEO W746BT
EO denotes the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.
DI denotes the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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